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Lobbying and Growth: Explaining Differences among OECD Countries♦ 
 
Mehmet Babacan∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper is an attempt to observe the effects of the development of rent-seeking or lobbying groups on the 
growth pace of a number of countries. The relationship between the policy suggestions of competing 
interest groups, and economic policies implemented both at micro and macro level after the 1980s revealed 
the importance of lobbying effect on policies fostering or inhibiting most of the developing countries’ long-
run growth levels. In addition to the vast literature on the positive theory of regulation and the theories of 
competition among the pressure groups, the current study is to provide some examples of the literature on 
lobbying and its effects on growth. Taking from Mancur Olson’s inspiring book, The Rise and Decline of 
Nations, this paper reviews the following literature and discussions with special emphasis on Gary Becker 
and Kevin M. Murphy’s works while adding an empirical component whether it is a panel or cross-country 
data analysis. Availability of the relevant data is a major concern due to the inconsistencies in measuring 
the size and effect of lobbying for each country. A set of countries including only the OECD members will 
constitute the subject of the empirical investigation. The dataset on the special interest groups is provided 
from K.G. Saur’s World Guide to Trade Associations as do the previous studies. For the purpose of the 
further research, some derivations and proposals would be provided to solve the puzzle. The study has the 
intuition that the development of lobbying powers is closely related to other political factors effective on 
growth rates such as democracy, civil society. Overall, the paper is to investigate the role of lobbying on 
growth rates on a multi-country level while implying the effects to change relatively in accordance with 
country specific effects. Thus the conclusion will state that depending on the country specific patterns, each 
OECD member exhibits slightly different effects of the relative size –by proxies- and number of business 
interest groups on growth due to the country specific effects. This work specifically focuses on Turkey 
which is shown to have negligible effect on the overall club members in terms of special interest groups on 
growth. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Theory of special interest groups and clubs is in essence the subject of multiple sub-disciplines 
under the economic theory. Under the industrial organization literature for instance, there is a wide 
consensus on the positive externalities of lower costs of forming special interest groups that serve 
their members’ interests at best. The political economy of clubs has also been a subject of dispute 
on the grounds of their welfare effects and class mobilization. The vast literature on explaining 
growth dynamics on the other hand still promises different aspects of explaining differences among 
countries, whether based on political or economic structures. The main question and discussions in 
the growth literature has long been on the dynamics and the mechanism through which different 
economic and social structures affect it. Emergence of political, economic or other social action 
groups deserves a multi-dimensional approach for analysis since it has micro and macro 
foundations at the same time. This preliminary study aims to bring up new arguments on the 
differences among countries’ experiences in terms of the special interest groups. The current study 
however due to its limitations will take two basic aspects of the ‘special interest groups’ or the 
‘collective action groups’ as the pioneering economist Mancur Olson (1965, 1982) states: the 
formation and the logic of operation of such groups and their indispensible relationship with the 
countries’ long-term economic performance. As Olson (1982) states, the theories of social classes 
and rigidities effective on relative growth are debatable and the empirical facts vary over time and 
country whether they are in line with the theories or not. Possibility of multi-causal cases is yet 
another concern regarding the relationship between growth and interest groups. Last not the least, 
problem of testing is important as multi-casual diversity may imply the same empirical result while 
having different reasoning and interpretations. 
 
Theory of ‘collective actions’ as Olson (1965) puts it or the ‘clubs’ as Buchanan (1965) refers, have 
two basic dimensions to be reviewed and analyzed in this work: the formation and determinants of 
special interest groups or lobbying powers and their relationship with the growth performance 
under a multi-country and time variant scheme. Taking from the long-debated arguments that Olson 
(1965 and 1982) put forward, along with that of Buchanan’s (1965) regarding the theory of interest 
groups, the paper will provide a short intuition on the factors leading to formation of successful 
interest groups and the distinction on pure private and public goods. After the brief theoretic 
introduction of different arguments and counter-perspectives, second section will reflect insights on 
the empirical evidences in the literature, factual or counter-factual to Olson’s (1982) arguments on 
the relationship between relative growth performances of different countries in different time spans. 
The literature however provides contrary examples of empirical evidence depending on the sample 
set and the existence of time sensitive data analysis. Therefore, it is evident that Olson’s (1982) 
arguments on the negative effects of special pressure groups on growth rates could be refuted in 
specific cases.  
 
This study aims at indicating different empirical results stem from different social and political 
structures along with the strength of pressure groups in a country within a relevant time span in the 
third section. The most evident empirical differences are observed among the OECD countries 
  
which include a diversified set of countries such as the Nordic, former Soviet and developing 
nations like Mexico and Turkey. The empirical section for now only includes a set of data on social 
and economic indicators along with the number of special interest groups which enable the data 
analysis and some correlation matrices. Nevertheless, it is an intuitive section that could yield 
further insight for data analysis in order to track the path for understanding the dynamics of interest 
groups. Third section will also address the question of possibility of multi-casual relationship along 
with the issues related to panel data analysis such as endogeneity. Last and the concluding section 
will imply at least at the descriptive level that the effects of special pressure or interest groups 
would differ on growth rates depending on the country and time specific effects along with the 
relevant dummy variables such as the economic freedom and political stability and quality 
indicators. 
 
 
 
II. Literature Review: Formation of Interest Groups and Effects on Growth 
 
In an effort to understand the formation process and the structure of interest groups, Olson’s 
pioneering work; The Logic of Collective Action (1965) should be counted with Buchanan’s leading 
paper on the Economic theory of Clubs (1965) in order to provide some insight at structural level. In 
his dissertation thesis, Olson (1965) makes use of the basic postulates for individual action that 
presumes self-interest maximizing behavior while answering the question of interest group 
structures in a society. Accordingly, a successful and prolonged interest group should be smaller in 
size yielding positive gaining for its members that is the group actions to create an average level of 
benefits exceeding the costs. The problem of ‘free-riding’ however may emerge under the condition 
that there is no selective incentive. The larger the group size, the more the number of ‘free-riders’, 
implies the theory. This is mostly due to the misalignment of interests among the group members 
and the very trivial share of average benefit to the members in a very large group. Therefore, Olson 
(1982) argues that smaller the group size, effective and successful is the lobbying activity. The 
same is argued within the theory of clubs, by Buchanan (1965), who puts forward the conclusion 
that given the set of adjustable property rights, the optimal group size tends to be smaller when the 
average real income increases. Such a mechanism however would only work if the goods provided 
by the group (i.e. privileges) are considered as exclusive in order to avoid the ‘free-rider’ problem 
seen very common in public good provision. Selective incentives, as Olson (1982) puts it are not 
always positive but sometimes occur at negative margins such as being excluded from the ‘club’. 
Therefore, overall are five basic conditions for the formation and success of an interest group, 
according to Olson’s (1982) theory: 
i) Positive gains from lobbying 
ii) Existence of selective incentives 
iii) Exclusive goods (i.e. perfect market information on the specific good) that create negative 
and/or positive externalities 
iv) Homogeneity of the group members/ alignment of interests 
v) Existence of property rights regime or low cost of bargaining for collective action 
 
  
Olson’s (1965, 1982); Buchanan’s (1965); Peltzman (1976) and Becker’s (1983) arguments all 
point the theoretical fact that the smaller the size of and the bigger is the net benefit to the pressure 
group, the more incentive that the individual has in joining and contributing the group. The 
following set of equations –adapted from Olson (1982) - is to explain the mechanism: 
 where (C) is the cost of collective action as a function of the level (T) at which the good is 
provided 
 where  represents the value of the good to the group; while  is the ‘size’ therefore 
number of the members of the group 
 while   is the fraction 
 where  is the net benefit to the individual that depends on the level of individual 
expenditure 
 
Under the maximization assumptions, first-order conditions should yield the following: 
 since  while  and  are constants. Replacing  into the preceding 
equation yields the following: 
 .  Therefore, the smaller the individual share,  is, the less the individual is eager to 
take part in the group as the average benefit gets smaller while the group size increases. 
 
Following the above logical line, Olson (1982) argues that there will be no countries that attain 
symmetrical organization of all groups with a common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes 
through comprehensive bargaining. Relatively more stable countries will tend to create more 
organizations for collective action over time while members of ‘small’ groups have incredibly 
higher organizational power, lowering the costs while that power is to diminish over time. And last 
not the least, he argues that emergence and persistence of such interest groups overall reduces 
efficiency and aggregate income in the society since they are divisive in nature. Two basic points 
that both Tullock (1983) and North (1983) pay attention are: testing and refutability of Olson’s 
theoretical and semi-empirical conclusions in a wider range of countries; and the position of the 
‘statecraft’ as the main interest group. 
 
Empirical evidence from the literature however exhibits significant variation as Coates et al. (2007) 
derive the conclusion that the multi-year and cross-country empirical tests of Olson’s (1982) 
arguments support that the interest group activity exerts a sclerotic effect on growth, capital 
accumulation, and technological advance. The results however should only be interpreted as partial 
success as Heckelman (2000) refers to Murrell’s (1984) counter-factual results. The most striking 
feature of Coates et al. (2007a and 2007b) and Heckelman (2000) is the use of number of special 
interest groups to proxy with how effective is the organization of such pressure groups in a society. 
Their distinctive analysis however covers the non-OECD countries contrary to other works which 
  
take the data-rich OECD countries as empirical samples. Coates et al. (2007a) focus on the 
determinants of interest group formation as they analyze a set of 140 countries with some 618 
observations in order to provide a more robust analysis and reconcile conflicting previous works’ 
results. Six hypotheses are tested with a broader sample: stability, development, political system, 
nation size, government size, diversity while different panel data and cross-country setup tests are 
utilized (1973 and 1999): natural log of number of groups function as the dependent variable along 
with the other independent determinants. Their findings support Olson’s hypothesis that stability 
fosters group formation; political system, nation size and societal diversity positively related to the 
number of groups. Coates et al. (2007b) however directly focus on testing the relative effects of 
interest-group activity on the GDP growth (in annual real terms); capital stock growth and 
productivity growth, two channels of impact on the growth performance. A total of 86 countries 
with 169 number of observations under a panel and two cross-country settings constitute the data 
set for empirical part in their analysis. In order to avoid possible endogeneity problem, Coates et al. 
make use of initial values of potentially endogenous explanatory variables as instruments, along 
with latitude, a dummy variable for OECD membership, and a dummy variable for majority 
Muslim population. They find that interest groups variable has clearly a negative sign while simple 
correlation between interest groups and growth is positive although it takes a negative sign when 
initial GDP, schooling, volatility and population are included. The instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions clearly exert a more significant and negative impact of the interest groups on growth, 
compared to that of simple OLS regressions. In their sensitivity analysis, Coates et al. consider the 
possible differences among the developed and developing nations and conclude that there is not a 
significant difference regarding the effects of interest groups on GDP and productivity growth.   
 
Heckelman (2000) builds up his empirical work on the shoulders of the literature came after 
Olson’s book while using a direct test methodology with relevant instruments, unlike the preceding 
works, by Murrell (1984) who finds that the length of stability has a strong impact on the formation 
of interest groups, for instance. As Heckelman (2000) puts forward, most of the studies have not 
shown a strong correlation between interest groups and growth while in his empirical analysis, the 
use of instruments increase the estimated impact of special interest groups on the economy. 
Heckelman (2000) includes 22 OECD member and 20 other countries as the sample data set for his 
analysis while instruments the strength of special interest groups by their numbers for each country. 
Using the growth data for the 42 relevant countries between 1970 and 1980 from the World Bank’s 
(1994) list, Heckelman analyzes the effects of the special interest groups on the economic growth 
along with the uncorrelated error term, in is model. His instrument for the strength of the special 
interest groups is their number as in Murrell (1984). After running several bivariate regressions 
using IV (instrumental variable) method, Heckelman (2000) concludes that Olson’s hypothesis is 
coherent given the soundness of the IV. In several other regressions run, where the initial level of 
GDP; ratio of the gross domestic investment to GDP; the ratio of government spending to GDP; 
total population and the ratio of the urban population to the total are included, Heckelman (2000) 
indicates that the high correlation between the strength of special interest groups and growth rates 
remain persistent. Even though, it is not so clear from inconsistent estimates of the lobbying power 
effect on growth rates, the relationship could be said to carry a non-zero coefficient at least.  
 
Providing a business perspective on the issue, another work focusing on East Asian countries, 
Doner and Schneider (2000) find that the business associations contribute to the economic growth 
  
in several ways such as macroeconomic stabilization and reform; horizontal coordination (like 
quota allocation and capacity reduction); vertical coordination (upstream-downstream); lowering 
information costs; setting standards and quality upgrading. According to their study, business 
groups contribute to the economy mainly or under certain conditions solely by pursuing their own 
interests. Two broad categories of contribution are described as ‘market-supporting’ and ‘market 
complementing’ activities in the sense of interest groups’ contribution. Doner and Schneider (2000) 
conclude that the well-functioning and contributing interest groups are the ones with higher 
member densities; that provide valuable resources to their members and have adequate internal 
mechanisms for mediating member interests. 
 
Mork’s (1993) argument on the impact of lobbyists however may be even positive compared to the 
non-lobbyist case. His basic intuition is that the growth rate would be higher in the case of lobbying 
compared to the situation where lobbying activities are strictly banned such as in the former-Soviet 
countries. In line with Olson’s (1982) arguments, Mork (1993) notes that lobbying activities have 
bigger marginal effects at lower levels (i.e. # of the groups) and are subject to diminishing returns 
in time. Murphy et al. (1991) however provide a different perspective on how easy a rent-seeking 
society could develop interest groups and conclude that rent-seeking activity is subject to very 
natural increasing returns thus having more returns at higher levels and second is it could afflict 
innovative activity in the society and therefore hinder economic growth. Maitland (1985) on the 
other hand concludes that Olson’s (1982) theory tested by the effects of business and labor groups 
is empirically true under relevant circumstances such as the higher correlation between the overall 
direction of the group and the members’ incentives. A series of empirical papers is subject to a 
comparative analysis in the below table (following pages): 
  
Table 1- Relationship between Special Interest Groups and Growth 
Theoretical and 
Descriptive: Maitland 
(1985) 
 “Encompassing” 
Political Action 
Committee (PAC) 
analysis; based on 
campaign 
contributions 
 
 Three level of PACs: 
Business-Industry 
(BIPAC), National 
Federation of 
Independent Business 
(NFIB PAC), the 
National Chamber 
Alliance and on the 
labor side: AFL-CIO 
 
 Measures of PAC 
strategy: share of 
contributions to 
challengers; and the 
share went to 
Republicans or 
Democrats in the case 
of labor PACs (high 
score: ideological- low 
score: pragmatic) and 
partisanship measure 
 
 The size of the PACs 
Theoretical and 
Modeling: Mork 
(1993) 
 An endogenous 
growth model with 
lobbying like 
Romer’s (1986); 
based on knowledge 
accumulation and 
imperfect 
acquisition 
 
 Firms rent capital; 
allowed to lobby for 
a subsidy on the 
capital use; no 
collusion among 
firms 
 
 Cost of lobbying 
specified as a 
percentage of the 
firms’ output for a 
given level of 
lobbying effort 
 
 The subsidy for 
capital use through 
lobbying efforts is 
financed by lump-
sum tax 
 
Theoretical and 
Descriptive: Doner 
and Schneider (2000) 
 Business 
associations 
contribute to the 
economic growth in 
several ways such as 
macroeconomic 
stabilization and 
reform; horizontal 
coordination (like 
quota allocation and 
capacity reduction); 
vertical coordination 
(upstream-
downstream);  
lowering 
information costs; 
setting standards 
and quality 
upgrading 
 
 Business groups 
contribute to the 
economy mainly or 
under certain 
conditions solely by 
pursuing their own 
interests 
 
 Two broad 
categories of 
contribution: 
Empirical: 
Heckelman (2000) 
 Includes 22 
OECD member and 
20 other countries as 
the sample data set; 
instruments the 
strength of special 
interest groups by 
their numbers for 
each country 
 Use of growth 
data for the 42 
relevant countries 
between 1970 and 
1980 from the World 
Bank (1994) 
 Analyzes the 
effects of the special 
interest groups on the 
economic growth 
along with the 
uncorrelated error 
term, in his model 
 Instrument 
for the strength of the 
special interest groups 
is their number 
 Runs several 
bivariate regressions 
using IV 
(instrumental 
variable) method 
 Concludes 
Empirical: Coates et 
al. (2007a) 
 Determinants 
of interest group 
formation under the 
light of investigation 
 Builds on 
Murrell (1984) and 
Bischoff (2003) 
 Primary 
objective: to provide 
more reliable and 
thorough tests of 
interest group 
formation theories; 
second objective: 
reconcile the 
conflicting findings of 
Murrell and Bischoff 
 Murrell 
(1984) finds support 
for Olson’s 
hypothesis that more 
groups form in stable 
environments by 
freedom to organize 
 Bischoff 
(2003) finds no 
support at all 
 Coates et al. 
include a panel of 140 
countries, 618 
observations as the 
sample data set for 
Empirical: Coates et 
al. (2007b) 
 Relationship 
between special-
interest groups and 
economic growth 
questioned 
 Includes a 
total of 169 
observations of 86 
countries as the 
sample data set 
 Referring to 
Olson’s (1982) 
previous test that 
found negative 
relationship between 
income growth and 
union membership, 
paper claims that the 
group activity is not 
well-reflected and 
there is a lack of 
control for other 
growth determinants 
 Coates and 
Heckelman (2003a 
and 2003b) find 
negative relation 
between interest 
group activity and 
growth and 
investment in a cross-
country setting 
  
and their measure of 
partisanship is 
effective on the 
amount of 
contribution under 
certain circumstances 
(i.e. structure of 
interest organization) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Technology of 
production” 
modeled in a 
response function 
form (subsidy in 
terms of lobbying 
effort) 
 
 Equilibrium level of 
lobbying constant 
over time; growth 
rate constant over 
time 
 
 Three results 
derived: i) 
equilibrium growth 
rate is higher in the 
case of lobbying 
compared to non-
lobbying and policy 
ban case; ii) if the 
subjective discount 
rate is low enough, 
welfare improves; 
iii) equilibrium 
approaches the first-
best solution if the 
response function 
for lobbying is 
initially very steep 
while flatten outs so 
quickly 
‘market-supporting’ 
and ‘market 
complementing’ 
activities in the sense 
of interest groups’ 
contribution 
 Well-
functioning and 
contributing interest 
groups are the ones 
with higher member 
densities; that provide 
valuable resources to 
their members and 
have adequate 
internal mechanisms 
for mediating 
member interests 
that Olson’s 
hypothesis is coherent 
given the soundness of 
the IV 
 Several other 
regressions run, 
where the initial 
level of GDP; ratio 
of the gross domestic 
investment to GDP; 
the ratio of 
government 
spending to GDP; 
total population and 
the ratio of the 
urban population to 
the total are 
included 
 
 Indicates that the 
high correlation 
between the strength 
of special interest 
groups and growth 
rates remain 
persistent 
his analysis 
 Six hypotheses 
tested with a broader 
sample: stability, 
development, political 
system, nation size, 
government size, 
diversity 
 Panel data 
and cross-country 
setup tests (1973 and 
1999): natural log of 
number of groups as 
the dependent 
variable 
 Findings 
support Olson’s 
hypothesis that 
stability fosters group 
formation; political 
system, nation size 
and societal diversity 
positively related to 
the number of groups 
 Support for 
the group formation 
hypothesis tested by 
Murrell (1984) and 
Bischoff (2003) with 
exception of larger 
government 
encourages interest 
group formation 
 Attempt to 
directly test the 
relationship between 
interest group activity 
and growth with 
other determinants of 
growth in a panel 
setting w/ two time 
periods (1985 and 
1995) 
 Accuracy of 
data problematic for 
developing nations; 
groups assumed to 
possess equal power; 
no data on group 
strength 
 Coates and 
Heckelman (2003) 
focus on groups per 
capita; find that a 
given # of group in a 
smaller country will 
have more sclerotic 
effect 
 A log-linear 
regression; OECD 
membership proxy 
for development 
 GDP growth 
(annual average real 
growth: 1985-1994 
and 1995-2004) with 
control variables 
initial GDP, 
schooling, volatility 
and population 
  
 Find negative 
relation between 
growth and interest 
groups   
 
  
 
III. Lobbying Power and Growth: A Counter-factual Relationship? Example from 
OECD Countries 
 
Empirical evidence is essential for crossing lines between growth performance of a specific country 
as well as set of countries under the light of existing theoretical debates. Such a test should provide 
a solid ground for contesting theories from different perspectives supported with different results. In 
this study, a panel data set of the OECD countries has been worked on while inconsistencies among 
the time intervals and lack of relevant information for the former-Soviet countries put the data 
analysis under the limits of explanatory data analysis. In this preliminary format, we will provide a 
general sense of the relative growth performances of the OECD countries depending on the country 
and time-specific conditions. Many of the empirical studies such as Heckelman (2000); Coates et al. 
(2007a and 2007b) focus on increasing the diversity among the sample countries thus see the 
applicability of Olson’s (1982) theory on different set of countries such as the OECD and non-
OECD. The major problem they face is also a limitation here: the inconsistency in the World Guide 
to Trade Associations data for the number of interest groups. Therefore our analysis will only 
provide two similar samples which belong to the 3rd, 5th and the 6th versions that include both the 
business associations and chambers of commerce.  
 
The dataset used here also comes from the Guide (eds. 1985, 1995 and 1999) while other 
limitations come from the democracy variable which is proxied by Freedom House index of FIW 
2001-2002; economic freedom index by The Heritage Foundation for only 1995, 1999 and 2002. 
Growth rates are from the OECD’s website along with the data from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 2008 of the World Bank Group and Penn World Table 6.2 edition. The simple data summary 
provided below suggest that there is a clear relationship between the included ‘exogenous’ variables 
while there is still a high possibility of ‘endogeneity’ due to the theoretically strong relationship 
between economic and political freedom and the development of special interest groups. The 
dataset is composed of 30 OECD nations with 90 observations in three different points in time 
(1985, 1999 and 2002). The number of interest groups is measured with the total of special interest 
organizations and chamber of commerce in a specific country, while entering into the regression 
with its per capita value. 
 
 
 Table 2- Number of Special Interest Groups (1985, 1999 and 2002) in the OECD members 
    Year     
 1985   1999   2002  
OECD Member Country 
# of 
SIO # of COC # of SIO # of COC # of SIO # of COC 
Australia (1971) 196 182  339 136  302 143 
Austria (1961) 1717 1695  1596 1575  1646 1636 
Belgium (1961) 816 790  588 525  722 692 
  
Canada (1961) 1228 1215  772 123  758 149 
Czech Republic (1995) 43 41  103 10  117 47 
Denmark (1961) 691 686  329 321  267 262 
Finland (1969) 369 349  208 182  162 138 
France (1961) 2860 2798  2215 1788  2137 1766 
Germany (1961) 5058 5000  5965 5773  5279 5113 
Greece (1961) 120 103  159 79  124 71 
Hungary (1996) 38 37  55 30  40 20 
Iceland (1961)  63 62  40 39  20 19 
Ireland (1961) 215 199  210 144  259 197 
Italy (1962) 905 804  394 259  449 213 
Japan (1964) 867 847  868 800  713 667 
Korea (1996) 64 58  117 64  166 125 
Luxembourg (1961) 112 110  78 71  76 75 
Mexico (1994) 255 214  263 209  190 146 
Netherlands (1961) 1125 1098  647 587  562 527 
New Zealand (1973) 54 52  102 79  100 79 
Norway (1961) 660 655  400 381  375 362 
Poland (1996) 108 108  73 5  71 27 
Portugal (1961) 75 67  80 58  97 93 
Slovak Republic (2000) 0 0  21 14  28 24 
Spain (1961) 603 521  466 347  472 380 
Sweden (1961) 528 512  362 343  362 337 
Switzerland (1961) 1160 1126  1110 1059  1040 1021 
Turkey (1961) 92 78  315 65  295 56 
United Kingdom (1961) 2539 2497  2022 1841  2067 1910 
United States (1961) 3383 3316  11519 3796  10526 4012 
 
Source: World Guide to Trade Associations (ed. 3, 5 and 6) 
 
 
 
Table 3- Cross-Country OECD Growth Rates (1985, 1999 and 2002) 
    
 1985 1999 2002 
OECD Member Country Real GDP growth Real GDP growth Real GDP growth 
  
Australia (1971) 4,4 4 3,2 
Austria (1961) 2,6 3,3 0,9 
Belgium (1961) 1,7 3,4 1,5 
Canada (1961) 4,8 5,5 2,9 
Czech Republic (1995) -11,71 1,3 1,9 
Denmark (1961) 4 2,6 0,5 
Finland (1969) 3,3 3,9 1,6 
France (1961) 1,7 3,3 1 
Germany (1961) 2,3 2 02 
Greece (1961) 2,5 3,4 3,9 
Hungary (1996) 03 4,2 4,4 
Iceland (1961)  3,3 4,1 -0,1 
Ireland (1961) 3,1 10,4 6,6 
Italy (1962) 2,8 1,9 0,3 
Japan (1964) 5,1 -0,1 0,3 
Korea (1996) 6,8 9,5 7 
Luxembourg (1961) 2,8 8,4 4,1 
Mexico (1994) 2,8 3,8 0,8 
Netherlands (1961) 2,3 4,7 0,1 
New Zealand (1973) 0,8 5,3 4,6 
Norway (1961) 5,4 2 1,5 
Poland (1996) 4 (app.)4 4,5 1,4 
Portugal (1961) 2,8 3,8 0,8 
Slovak Republic (2000) 3 0,3 4,1 
Spain (1961) 2,3 4,7 2,7 
Sweden (1961) 2,2 4,6 2,4 
Switzerland (1961) 3,5 1,3 0,4 
Turkey (1961) 4,2 -4,7 7,9 
United Kingdom (1961) 3,5 3 2,1 
United States (1961) 4,1 4,5 1,6 
 
Source: OECD (2008); WDI (2008) and Penn World Table 6.2 
 
                                                 
1 Real GDP growth own calculation: Based on Penn World Table 6.2- year first available 1991. 
2 World Development Indicators (WDI) 2008- GDP growth. 
3 WDI 2008- GDP growth. 
4 Own calculation for 1986 Based on WDI 2008- GDP growth. 
  
The average growth rates of five-year and 10-year periods almost yield the same results since the 
real GDP growth rates are used in logarithmic terms in order to avoid any negative or zero 
relationship for the growth rate data. The simple correlation statistics in a cross-country analysis for 
the three points in time exhibit a close relationship between the number  and persistence of special 
interest groups developed in a country while economic and political freedom has also distinctive 
effects in the cases of former-Soviet countries along with Turkey. Countries such as Greece, Spain 
and Portugal which witnessed military coups have become a relatively more stable and democratic 
by 1985 already so that they exhibit more or less the same result: generation and prolonged 
existence of special interest groups could hinder economic growth rates –of course explanatory only 
in part. One important factor that limits the analysis is on the special interest group power which 
seems to be best measured through their size which the dataset available lacks in the cross-country 
sense. Adding that variable is expected to increase the explanatory power of the foremost 
exogenous variables dramatically. 
 
 
Table 4- Summary Statistics 
Mean  Standard Deviation  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
 
Independent Variable 
Full Sample (OECD)  
Number of Interest Groups 1700.133  2978.608  0  15315  90 
 Ex-Soviet Countries5  
Number of Interest Groups 88.33333  57.05712  0  216  12 
 Turkey 
Number of Interest Groups 300.3333  113.7995  170  380  3
           
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample (OECD)  
Real GDP Growth  2.885556  2.721143  -11.7  10.4  90 
 Ex-Soviet Countries  
Real GDP Growth  1.45   4.452476  -11.7  4.5  12 
 Turkey 
Real GDP Growth  2.466667  6.476367  -4.7  7.9  3 
 
Notes: In average/annual terms; real GDP growth rates replaced with GDP growth rates; where not available.  
                                                 
5 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. 
  
 
The simple OLS estimation and a 2SLS procedure imply that the per capita number of special 
interest organizations has little impact on the cross-country real GDP growth for the OECD sample 
size for the years 1985, 1999 and 2002. It is crystal clear that the number of observations –which is 
limited to 28 in our analysis- along with the yearly data, will have important effects in a more 
advanced research. Due to the limitations however, we will content with the comparative results of 
the two procedures cited above. The OLS estimation with the political freedom index causes the 
number of observations decline to 28 while any regression leaving the political freedom index out 
yields some 56 observations due to the missing data on economic freedom index and partly the real 
GDP numbers for the given years. Below is a simple OLS regression with the political freedom 
index variable, for the whole OECD countries, including Turkey. 
 
Table 5- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups 
 
Dependent Variable       Real GDP Growth 
Full Sample (OECD)    (OLS) 
 
               
Independent Variable 
 
Per capita SIO number (log)   -0.066 
      (0.871) 
Economic Freedom    0.123 
      (0.081) 
Political Freedom    1.989 
      (0.010) 
Late Join dummy index    0.420 
      (0.735) 
 
R-squared     0.30 
Observations     28 
 
Notes: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries sample data set.  
 
Omitting the political freedom index variable to increase the number of observations for a more powerful 
analysis yields the per capita number of special interest organizations posing a positive relation with the 
real GDP growth unlike in the previous regression. It is quite normal to have increased explanatory power 
for the rest of the independent variables once there is an omitted variable while the quality of results tends 
to decrease. 
  
 
 
Table 6- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups 
 
Dependent Variable       Real GDP Growth 
Full Sample (OECD)    (OLS) 
 
               
Independent Variable 
 
Per capita SIO number (log)   0.186 
      (0.580) 
Economic Freedom    0.027 
      (0.611) 
Late Join dummy index    0.523 
      (0.649) 
 
R-squared     0.017 
Observations     56 
 
Notes: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries sample data set. The political 
freedom index variable is omitted. 
 
 
Below table represents the regression results when Turkey, the only Muslim country and one of the OECD 
members with the worst economic freedom index as of 2002, is excluded from the sample data set. The 
coefficient of the per capita number of special interest groups do not vary much once an OECD member 
country is removed while the effect of economic freedom gains more importance in explaining the real 
GDP rates. Overall, the results do not change much with the removal of Turkey while the coefficient does 
change its sign once the political freedom index is removed. The relationship between the per capita 
number of special interest organizations and the real GDP growth rates in the years 1985, 1999 and 2002 
for OECD countries –either Turkey excluded or not- however still remains as a puzzle. 
 
 
Table 7- Real GDP Growth and Interest Groups 
 
Dependent Variable       Real GDP Growth 
  
Turkey excluded (OECD)    (OLS) 
 
               
Independent Variable 
 
Per capita SIO number (log)   0.146 
      (0.644) 
Economic Freedom    0.039 
      (0.427) 
Late Join dummy index    0.504 
      (0.648) 
 
R-squared     0.022 
Observations     54 
 
Note: Inside the parentheses are the p-values. The coefficients are for the whole OECD countries, excluding Turkey for the 
given years.  
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The present paper aims to see if the number of special interest groups has a strong effect on 
countries’ growth rates and sees severe dilemmas and limitations when it comes to empirical 
analysis. Two more steps are taken to improve the analysis: to use the log of average/single annual 
real GDP growth rates and make use of the number of special interest group divided by the 
population of countries. Using averages and percentages certainly improved the quality of the 
empirical part even though a lot is still missing. The theory however could be refuted under 
different country and time-specific characteristics that the past works have suggested so far. Next 
steps for more robust results should include a strikingly powerful data set and approach of empirical 
analysis to provide more robust intuition on Olson’s (1982) theory in practice. So far however, 
Turkey is shown to have a negligible impact regarding the change on the effects of special interest 
groups on growth performances. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Annex: Definition of Variables 
 
Number of the SIOs: # of special interest groups as of five different cross-sectional datasets from 
1973 (first), 1985 (third), 1995 (fourth), 1999 (fifth) and 2002 (sixth) editions of the World Guide to 
Trade Associations (Zils and Verrel), by K. G. Saur: 
 
  Year    
Edition of 
WTG 
 
 
Includes 
chambers 
         
  1973    1st  yes 
  1985    3rd  both 
  1995    4th  no 
  1999    5th  both 
  2002    6th  both 
 
Average real GDP growth rates: OECD data since 1960; Penn World Table 6.2 and World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2008 by the World Bank 
Data on former-Soviet countries: WDI 2008 and the Penn World Table 6.2 
Data on political rights and civil liberties: FIW 2001-2002 of the Freedom House (1: Free; 
7: Not Free) 
Economic freedom index (1 to 100): The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal 
(1995, 1999 and 2002) 
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Appendix 
  
 
A. List of the OECD Countries with Entrance Dates 
Australia / Australie (1971) 
Austria / Autriche (1961) 
Belgium / Belgique (1961) 
Canada / Canada (1961) 
Czech Republic / République tchèque (1995) 
Denmark / Danemark (1961) 
Finland / Finlande (1969) 
France / France (1961) 
Germany / Allemagne (1961) 
Greece / Grèce (1961) 
Hungary / Hongrie (1996) 
Iceland / Islande (1961)  
Ireland / Irlande (1961) 
Italy / Italie (1962) 
Japan / Japon (1964) 
Korea / Corée (1996) 
Luxembourg / Luxembourg (1961) 
Mexico / Mexique (1994) 
Netherlands / Pays-Bas (1961) 
New Zealand / Nouvelle-Zélande (1973) 
Norway / Norvège (1961) 
Poland / Pologne (1996) 
Portugal / Portugal (1961) 
Slovak Republic / République slovaque (2000) 
Spain / Espagne (1961) 
Sweden / Suède (1961) 
Switzerland / Suisse (1961) 
Turkey / Turquie (1961) 
United Kingdom / Royaume-Uni (1961) 
United States / États-Unis (1961) 
Source: OECD website, 2009. 
 
 
 
B. Freedom House Map (2005) 
 
  
 
Source: Freedom House, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
